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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 12-1025 
___________ 
 
VAIDAS KULBERKIS, 
Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
Respondent 
____________________________________ 
 
Petition for Review of an Administrative Order of  
the Department of Homeland Security 
(Agency No. A205-016-173) 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
November 15, 2012 
 
Before:  RENDELL, ALDISERT and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed November 19, 2012) 
___________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Vaidas Kulberkis, a citizen of Lithuania, petitions for review of an order of 
deportation issued by United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), an 
arm of the Department of Homeland Security.  For the reasons that follow, we will deny 
the petition. 
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I. 
 Because we write primarily for the parties, who are familiar with the background 
of this case, we discuss that background only briefly here.  In June 2009, Kulberkis was 
admitted to the United States pursuant to the Visa Waiver Program (“VWP”).  Under that 
program, “a qualifying visitor may enter the United States without obtaining a visa, so 
long as a variety of statutory and regulatory requirements are met.”  Bradley v. Att‟y 
Gen. of the U.S., 603 F.3d 235, 238 (3d Cir. 2010).  “Once admitted under the VWP, a 
visitor may remain in the United States for 90 days.”  Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1187(a)(1)).  
“[A] VWP visitor must waive his or her right to contest the government‟s admissibility 
determinations and removal actions, except that the alien may contest removal actions on 
the basis of asylum.”  Bradley, 603 F.3d at 238 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1187(a)-(b)).  “[U]nlike 
the ordinary removal case, a VWP entrant‟s removal „shall be determined by the district 
director who has jurisdiction over the place where the alien is found, and shall be effected 
without referral of the alien to an immigration judge for a determination of 
deportability.‟”  Bradley, 603 F.3d at 238 (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 217.4(b)). 
 Kulberkis ultimately remained in the United States beyond the VWP‟s 90-day 
period.  In March 2011, he married Dawn Petro, a United States citizen, in New Jersey.  
In December 2011, ICE‟s Field Office Director for Newark, New Jersey, ordered that 
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Kulberkis be deported for having remained in the country for a time longer than 
permitted.  Kulberkis now challenges that order.
1
  
II. 
 Kulberkis presents two arguments in support of his petition.  We consider them in 
turn. 
 He first contends that, although he was admitted to the United States as a VWP 
entrant, the record fails to establish that he waived his right to a removal hearing.  We 
previously considered a similar argument in Bradley.  There, Petitioner Heathcliffe 
Bradley claimed that his waiver under the VWP was invalid because it was not knowing 
and voluntary.  Bradley, 603 F.3d at 239-40.  Because that claim amounted to a due 
process challenge under the Fifth Amendment, we explained that Bradley could not 
prevail unless he established that he was “substantially prejudiced” by the allegedly 
invalid waiver.  Id. at 240.  We ultimately concluded that Bradley had not made that 
showing, for “[h]ad Bradley known the contents of the waiver and refused to sign, he 
would be in the same position as he is now — subject to summary removal without a 
hearing — and he would not now be eligible to adjust his status on the basis of his 
marriage to [his United States citizen wife].”  Id. at 241.  Because we are not persuaded 
                                              
1
 We have jurisdiction over Kulberkis‟s petition based on our authority to review final 
orders of removal.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1); Bradley, 603 F.3d at 237 n.1.  Although 
ICE‟s order was styled as an order of “deportation,” not an order of “removal,” “[w]e 
have repeatedly held, in a variety of contexts, that the terms „deportation‟ and „removal‟ 
are interchangeable.”  Sarango v. Att‟y Gen. of the U.S., 651 F.3d 380, 383 (3d Cir. 
2011). 
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that there is a meaningful distinction between Bradley and the case at bar, our reasoning 
in Bradley forecloses relief here.
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 Kulberkis‟s remaining argument is that his deportation order is void “because it 
was issued without allowing [him] to apply for marriage-based adjustment of status” 
under 8 U.S.C. § 1255(c)(4).
3
  (Pet‟r‟s Opening Br. 1.)  Again, we considered a similar 
argument in Bradley.  There, we held that, “although Bradley was once statutorily 
eligible under 8 U.S.C. § 1255(c)(4) for the adjustment he now seeks, he may not, after 
the expiration of his 90-day stay [under the VWP], adjust his status as a defense to 
removal.”  Bradley, 603 F.3d at 242.  Although Kulberkis maintains that his case is 
distinguishable from Bradley “because Bradley has filed his application for adjustment of 
status . . . and it was denied,” (Pet‟r‟s Opening Br. 3), our holding in Bradley did not 
hinge on those facts.  Rather, it hinged on the fact that Bradley applied to adjust status 
after the expiration of the VWP‟s 90-day period.  Because Kulberkis now seeks to do the 
same, our reasoning in Bradley controls and forecloses relief here. 
 In light of the above, we will deny Kulberkis‟s petition for review. 
                                              
2
 Given our resolution of this claim, we deny as unnecessary the Government‟s motion to 
supplement the record with evidence that Kulberkis indeed executed the VWP waiver. 
3
 Although § 1255(c)(4) “generally makes VWP entrants ineligible for the „adjustment of 
status‟ remedy,” that provision “carves out an exception for VWP entrants seeking to 
adjust their status on the basis of an immediate-relative petition.  The term „immediate 
relative‟ includes the spouse of a U.S. citizen.”  Bradley, 603 F.3d at 242 n.6 (citing 8 
U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i)). 
